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Abstract
This paper evaluates the welfare eﬀect of simple (but not optimal) monetary targeting rules
in a stochastic two-country open-economy model featuring producer price stickiness and
imperfect competition. We point out speciﬁc cases when the central bank would prefer
to stabilize the exchange rate rather than domestic producer prices as recommended by
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002b), Clarida et al. (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2002). Our
results suggest that an exchange rate peg is particularly desirable when the country is small
and faces an elastic export demand curve. Unlike earlier contributions, we evaluate welfare
using a second order approximation of the model’s structural equilibrium conditions as well
as of the welfare function.
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Should domestic monetary policy target the nominal exchange rate? Or should the central
bank adopt an inward-looking monetary policy and target only domestic output prices? Several
recent papers including Clarida et al. (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2002), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002b) have argued in favor of the latter option since it will close the output gap entirely
and thus attain the level of output and employment that would prevail in a ﬂexible price
world.1However, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) and Devereux and Engel (2003) stress that
inward-looking policies are not always optimal when prices are preset in local currency and
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are exposed to currency ﬂuctuations. Excessive exchange rate volatility can then
be detrimental to country welfare.
In this paper, we show that a policy of exchange rate stabilization can be desirable even
when prices are pre-set in the producer currency. Our model is a standard stochastic two-
country open-economy model featuring producer price stickiness and imperfect competition
also used in earlier contributions such as Clarida et al. (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ.
However, our work diﬀers from previoud work in a crucial way: Rather than assuming a
unitary value for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution over traded goods, we choose to
work with a more general CES preference speciﬁcation. By allowing for non unitary elasticity
values, we are able to highlight speciﬁc cases when the domestic central bank would prefer to
stabilize the exchange rate rather than domestic output prices. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that an
exchange rate peg is desirable when the domestic country is small, open and faces an elastic
export demand curve, i.e an intratemporal elasticity of substitution exceeding one. As traded
goods become more elastic, a policy of output price stabilization leads to a greater variability in
employment and thus higher uncertainty about marginal costs. In order to protect his markups,
the producer would want to charge higher average prices but cannot do so under a policy of
internal price stabilization. Ineﬃcient markup ﬂuctuations will occur and an ’inward-looking’
policy cannot be optimal.2
On the contrary, a unilateral exchange rate peg allows the producer to charge higher av-
erage prices in response to higher marginal cost uncertainty. As the elasticity of substitution
increases, his markups are then less aﬀected by real disturbances. Compared to the case of
producer price targeting, an exchange rate peg implies a more appreciated expected terms
1of trade and hence lower expected employment and consumption. For small countries facing
elastic export demand curves, the welfare gains from lower expected employment outweigh the
losses associated with lower expected consumption.
Interestingly, the reason why a small country would want to ﬁx the exchange rate diﬀers
markedly from more traditional arguments (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988) which, especially
in a European context, have emphasized ﬁxed exchange rate policies as a way of importing
monetary credibility. In this paper, monetary authorities are assumed to precommit to either
a policy of domestic producer price stabilization or a unilateral exchange rate peg. As such,
there is no credibility problem in our framework. The case for ﬁxing exchange rates in our
work is closely related to the point made by Benigno and Benigno (2003a) and in Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001a) that central banks in an open economy can use ”sticky prices to manipulate
the terms of trade to their own country’s advantage (Benigno and Benigno, 2003a)”. Our
results suggest that the incentive to exploit this so-called terms of trade externality increases
with the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and decreases with domestic country size.
The key parameter driving our results is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. For
non unitary values of this parameter, it is not possible to derive closed form solutions. We
therefore rely on a local approximation around a noneﬃcient steady state, i.e. no appropriate
subsidies are introduced to eliminate the steady state monopolistic distortions. This raises
a methodological issue since the country-speciﬁcw e l f a r em e a s u r ew ew a n tt od e r i v es h o u l d
capture the eﬀect of second order moments on the means of all our endogenous variables. As
explained in Benigno and Woodford (2003), a correct welfare evaluation therefore requires a
second order Taylor approximation to the structural equilibrium conditions of the model as well
as to the welfare function. For this purpose, we evaluate welfare using both the computational
approach based on perturbation methods described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Collard
and Juillard (2000) and Kim et al. (2003) as well as the analytical approach described in
Benigno and Woodford (2003). Both solution techniques support our ﬁnding namely that a
unilateral exchange rate peg welfare dominates producer price targeting when the country is
small, open and faces an elastic export demand curve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the main features of
the now standard model. Section 3 presents the solution technique while section 4 discusses
the calibration parameters. Section 5 reports the results from the computational as well as
2the analytical approach. Section 6 contains the conclusion and suggests directions for further
research.
2 A Stochastic Two-Country Model
The model is a stochastic two-country open-economy model featuring producer price stickiness
and imperfect competition. We assume that the world consists of two economies namely a
domestic and a foreign. Each economy is inhabitated by inﬁnitely-lived households i ∈ [0,1]
and monopolistic ﬁrms j ∈ [0,1]. Domestic households and domestic ﬁrms are distributed
along the continuum [0,n) while foreign households and ﬁrms reside on the interval [n,1]. As
always foreign variables in what follows below are denoted with an asterisk.
2.1 Consumer Preferences














where the parameter κ is the weight on disutility from working and χ represents the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply. We assume that the utility gains from holding real money are
zero and therefore leave out real money balances from the utility function.3 C (i) is the house-

































The parameter η is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign produced traded
goods. The parameter γ (γ∗) represents the expenditure weight of home (foreign) produced
3consumption goods in the aggregate consumption index. As will become clearer in the section
describing the calibration we will allow the domestic and foreign weight to diﬀer (γ 6= γ∗).
Households are assumed to maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
Z n
0
[PH,tCH,t (i)+PF,tCF,t(i)]di + Et{Qt,t+1Bt+1 (i)} (2)




where Bt+1 (i) is a state-contingent claim held at the end of period t, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor for nominal payoﬀsa n dπt(i,j)a r ep r o ﬁts of ﬁrm j received by household i in
period t. The remaining terms in the budget constraint describe the household’s consumption
expenditure and labor income.
The domestic household’s optimization problems can be summarized by the following standard



















F,t (i)=λt (i)PF,t (4)







where we are assuming that all agents work for all the domestic ﬁrms and hence receive
the same wage rate.
Finally, the domestic Euler equation states that for each possible state of nature that may
occur in the next period, the following condition has to hold:
λt (i)=βItEt [λt+1 (i)] (6)
where
It = Et [Qt,t+1]
−1
4is the nominal (gross) return on the state-contingent bond that will be paid to the repre-
sentative household irrespective of the state in t +1 .
Note that foreign households face a symmetric optimization problem and have access to the
same state-contingent nominal bond. Complete markets imply then that in each period and










where St is the home currency price of one unit of foreign currency.
2.2 Firms and Optimal Price Setting
2.2.1 Production technologies, Intermediate and Final Output and Price Indexes
Firms are assumed to be monopolistic producers of domestic and foreign brands, indexed by
j ∈ [0,1]. The [0,n) interval is populated by domestic ﬁrms, while foreign ﬁrms lie on the [n,1]
interval. The production process for domestic brands relies on a simple linear technology in a






Foreign ﬁrms use a similar production technology, which requires a foreign composite labor
input. We assume that productivity is country-speciﬁc and that it follows a trend-stationary
















whereas the country-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,εt =( εH
t ,εF
t ), has the variance-covariance matrix V (εt).
T h eb r a n d sp r o d u c e di nb o t hc o u n t r i e sc a nb et h o u g h to fa si n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s ,w h i c ha r e
then sold to a domestic and to a foreign competitive ﬁrm. The domestic competitive ﬁrm

























The parameter θ measures the elasticity of substitution across brands, which is assumed to
be greater than one. For simplicity, we also impose that θ is the same for both domestic and
foreign produced brands.






















Thus, each individual ﬁrm acts as a monopolistic producer and faces a downward sloping
demand - derived from the competitive ﬁrm ’s proﬁt maximization problem - for its brand of

















Demand for each brand j is positively related to aggregate demand - YH,t and YF,t respectively
- and inversely related to relative prices. The relative price elasticity of demand for a single
brand is increasing in the elasticity of substitution across the diﬀerent brands, θ. The prices for
the ﬁnal goods sold on the foreign markets have the same functional forms and foreign ﬁrms
face similar demand conditions. Thus, given that both domestic and foreign brands are traded
w o r l d w i d ew ea s s u m et h a tt h el a wo fo n ep r i c eh o l d sf o re a c hi n d i v i d u a lb r a n dj and for all





6where St is the home currency price of one unit of foreign currency. The domestic terms






We further allow for the existence, in each country, of another competitive industry that com-






















































Since preferences are asymmetric across countries, PPP does not hold at the aggregate level
(Pt 6= StP∗
t ). In this case, the risk-sharing condition in (7) implies that the ratio of marginal
utilities equals the consumption-based real exchange rate.
2.2.2 Optimal Price Setting
We assume that ﬁrms set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983). Thus, only a
restricted number of domestic and foreign monopolistic producers , fractions 1 −α and 1−α∗
respectively, are able to reset their prices in each period. The optimal pricing equation of the



















where ˜ PH,t (j)i st h en e wp r i c es e tb yd o m e s t i cﬁrm j in period t, which will be in eﬀect in
period k>twith probability αk−t.
7The above optimal pricing rule holds for all the ﬁr m st h a tc a nr e s e tp r i c e si np e r i o dt.T h i s
allows us to impose that ˜ PH,t (j)= ˜ PH,t for all the period t price-setting ﬁrms distributed
on the [0,n) interval and to derive the following expression for the aggregate price level of












Equation (19) states that the aggregate domestic price level is a weighted average of new prices
˜ PH,t set in period t and the lagged value of the aggregate domestic price level. An equivalent
optimal price-setting condition holds for producers in the foreign country.
2.3 Monetary Policy
We assume that the domestic central bank can either precommit to a unilateral exchange
rate peg (PEG) or to a rule which stabilizes producer prices (DIT). In both cases, the foreign
central bank is assumed to have no choice and always precommits to targeting his own producer
prices (FIT). We therefore abstract from the game-theoretic aspects of monetary policy rules
explored elsewhere in the literature and leave this issue for future research. As in Benigno
and Benigno (2003a), we do not restrict monetary policy to a speciﬁc Taylor rule linking the
nominal interest rate to speciﬁc target variables. Instead, we assume that the domestic central
bank has direct control over either producer prices (DIT) or nominal exchange rates (PEG).5
2.4 Goods Markets and Equilibrium
Our model is closed by imposing that in each period domestic and foreign goods markets clear
in equilibrium, i.e.
nYH,t(i)=nCH,t (i)+( 1− n)C∗
H,t(i)( 2 0 )
(1 − n)YF,t(i)=nCF,t(i)+( 1− n)C∗
F,t(i)( 2 1 )
Equations (9), (11),(12), (19) as well as its foreign counterpart and (20), (21) characterize
together with the domestic and the foreign optimality conditions for households and ﬁrms and
the respective monetary policy rules the equilibrium outcome for the model.
82.5 Welfare Analysis
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003a) we assume that the domestic monetary authorities
rank the alternative monetary policy rules speciﬁed in Section 2.3 by comparing the expected















































3 Approach and Solution Techniques
Since the model does not yield a closed form solution, we will resort to approximation methods.
However, as explained in Sutherland (2002), the traditional log-linearization technique is not
well suited for welfare analysis since it precludes us from capturing the eﬀect of second order
moments on ﬁrst order moments. For instance, a ﬁrst order approach would not enable us to
analyze the eﬀect of exchange rate volatility on expected consumption and hence on welfare.
For this purpose, we employ both the computational approach based on perturbation methods
described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Collard and Juillard (2000) and Kim et al (2003)
as well as the analytical approach described in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
The computational method can be summarized as follows: We ﬁrst employ a Newton-type
optimization technique to derive the steady state solution of our nonlinear system of equations.6
We then take a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of the model’s structural equilibrium equa-
tions around this deterministic steady state. Next, we evaluate whether the Blanchard-Kahn
stability conditions are satisﬁed. Having veriﬁed that the system is stable, we then take a
second order Taylor approximation of the same structural equations around the non-eﬃcient
steady state. The system of equations is solved using the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
approach.7 The solution is then used to derive the implied ﬁrst and second order moments of
the endogenous variables.8
9The analytical approach is described in Benigno and Woodford (2003). It essentially relies
on taking a second order approximation to all the structural equilibrium conditions as well as to
the welfare function. Combining the second-order approximations to eliminate the linear terms
in the quadratic approximations to the welfare functions, yields a micro-founded loss-function
for the domestic central bank where the welfare losses depend on quadratic deviations of terms
of trade, domestic and foreign output and inﬂation rates from their respective target values.
Compared to the computational approach, the Benigno and Woodford (2003) method yields a
direct analytical expression for the loss function that better allows for intuitive interpretations.
4 Calibration
The parameters in our benchmark welfare calculation are similar to the calibration described
in Gali and Monacelli (2002). The discount factor is set at β =0 .99 which corresponds to a
steady state interest rate of 4% in a quarterly model. The risk-aversion coeﬃcient is set at
ρ = 1. The persistence parameters in the technology process are set to A11 = A22 =0 .9. Gali
and Monacelli (2002) calibrate the productivity process on the basis of estimates for Canada
and the United States. Therefore they assume the standard deviations of country-speciﬁc
technology shocks to be σH = σF = 1% with a cross-country correlation of 0.77. This implies
ac o v a r i a n c eo fσHF =0 .000077.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The elasticity of substitution across diﬀerentiated goods is set at θ = 6 which implies an average
steady-state markup of 20%. The weight on the disutility of labor κ is assumed to be 1 and
the Frisch labor supply elasticity 1
χ i ss e tt o0 . 3 3( χ = 3). The degree of price stickiness is
captured by the parameter α. Following the work of Gali et al (2001), it is assumed to be 0.75,
which implies an average contract duration of 4 quarters. According to Gali and Monacelli,
the share of imports in Canadian GDP is 40%. They therefore set γ in the domestic aggregate
consumption index, equation (14), to 0.6. Since they calibrate their model on a small open
economy, we assume that the size of the domestic economy is n =0 .005 or 0.5% of the larger
foreign economy.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution across traded goods is assumed to be unitary in the
Gali and Monacelli (2002) calibration. However, there is great uncertainty about the true value
10of this elasticity. The RBC literature usually assumes values between 0.9 and 2 while more
recent work by Lai and Treﬂer (2002) ﬁnds estimates for the elasticity of substitution around
5.50.9 Rather than settling on one parameter value, we present results for values ranging from
1 to 10. The foreign expenditure weight γ∗ is pinned down by the condition that the trade
balance has to be balanced in the steady state.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Why is Producer Price Targeting suboptimal?
A central result in our analysis is that producer price targeting can be a suboptimal policy
rule for the domestic country.10 This suboptimality occurs as the elasticity of substitution
increases and the domestic country becomes relatively smaller. One way to understand this
result is to consider how domestic employment responds to, say, a positive domestic produc-
tivity shock. Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of several variables including
domestic employment to a domestic (normalized) positive productivity shock. The functions
were generated with the above calibration parameters except that we impose symmetric coun-
try sizes (n =0 .5) and that the domestic and the foreign central banks are assumed to target
their producer prices. We explore how the impulse responses vary to diﬀerent values of the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Several results stand out: For the benchmark case
usually considered in the literature (η = 1), domestic employment is completely insulated from
the productivity shock while the terms of trade responds in a one-to-one relationship. How-
ever, as the elasticity of substitution increases and goods become elastic, domestic employment
responds more and the terms of trade less to a productivity shock. The higher variability of
employment aﬀects the domestic producer’s price setting decision. From his point of view,
higher employment variability implies higher uncertainty about his marginal costs. In order
to protect markups, the producer would want to charge higher average prices but cannot do
so under a policy of internal price stabilization. Therefore markup ﬂuctuations will occur why
an ’inward-looking’ policy might be suboptimal for high values of η.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
T h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s ef u n c t i o n si nF i g u r e2e x p l o r eh o wt h er e s u l t sc h a n g ew h e nt h ed o m e s t i c
country size varies. In this experiment, the elasticity of substitution was ﬁxed at η = 6. Note
11that the domestic employment and the terms of trade respond more to a domestic productivity
shock, as the domestic country size decreases. Again, the domestic producer in the small
country would want to set higher prices in order to protect his markups but is prevented from
doing so by the ’inward-looking’ policy.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
5.2 Welfare comparisons
5.2.1 Results from the computational methods
We now apply the computational methods outlined in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to
calculate welfare under the two alternative monetary regimes.11 In one regime, the domestic
and the foreign central bank both pursue ’inward-looking’ policies (DIT,FIT). In the other,
the domestic monetary authorities peg their currency while the foreign central bank targets
foreign producer prices (PEG,FIT).
Figure 3 reports country-speciﬁc welfare for the two monetary regimes when countries are
equally sized. While welfare is calculated for diﬀerent values of the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution, all other parameters take on the values described in Table 2. The upper and
lower panel report respectively values for domestic and foreign welfare. The dash-dotted line
represents welfare when the domestic central bank pegs (upper panel) and the foreign monetary
authority (lower panel) targets producer prices. The solid line refers to welfare when both the
domestic (upper panel) and the foreign (lower panel) country pursue ’inward-looking’ policies.
The results clearly suggest that a unilateral exchange rate peg is never optimal. Domestic and
foreign welfare is higher in the case where both central banks target their producer prices i.e.
in the (DIT,FIT) regime.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
F i g u r e4p l o t sw e l f a r ef o rt h ec a s ew h e r et h es i z eo ft h ed o m e s t i cc o u n t r yi ss m a l l( n =
0.005) relative to the foreign country. A number of results arise: First, domestic welfare
in the (DIT,FIT) regime decreases as its export demand curve becomes more elastic. On the
contrary, under a unilateral peg domestic welfare increases with higher intratemporal elasticity
of substitution. For elasticity values higher than 5.5 — not an unreasonable assumption given
the estimates in Treﬂer and Lai (2002) — the domestic country is better oﬀ welfare-wise in
12the (PEG,FIT) monetary regime. Note, however, that the welfare diﬀerence across the two
r e g i m e si sq u i t es m a l l . 12 Second, the lower panel of Figure 4 indicates that being an anchor
country is not without costs: Welfare for the foreign country is lower in the (PEG,FIT) regime
compared to the scenario where both central banks target their own producer prices. However,
the foreign welfare loss is practically nil.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
T h er o l eo fr e l a t i v ec o u n t r ys i z e si se x p l o r e di nF i g u r e5 . C o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁcw e l f a r ei sc a l -
culated for diﬀerent values of the domestic country size n ranging from 0.15% up to 10%.
Throughout the experiment, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, η, is assumed to equal
6. The upper panel reports the diﬀerence in domestic welfare across the two regimes calculated
as welfare under (PEG,FIT) minus welfare under (DIT,FIT). We note that the diﬀerence is
positive when the domestic country is small (n<0.03).13 This implies that domestic welfare
under a unilateral peg is higher compared to the case where both central banks target their
producer prices. As the size of the domestic country increases, the diﬀerence becomes nega-
tive and the (DIT,FIT) regime increasingly welfare dominates a unilateral exchange rate peg.
The lower panel contains the foreign welfare diﬀerence across the two regimes. The numbers
conﬁrm that the foreign country is always worse oﬀ welfare-wise being the anchor country.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
To gain some additional insights into our result, Figure 6 plots the ﬁrst moments and second
moments of the terms of trade, domestic consumption, domestic employment and domestic
notional prices.14 We calculate moments for diﬀerent values of η across the two monetary
regimes. Further, the values were derived using the standard calibration and assuming that the
size, n, of the domestic country equals 0.005. The upper panel reports the percent diﬀerences
in means across regimes. A negative number indicates that the corresponding mean value
is lower under the exchange rate peg (PEG,FIT) relative to the ’inward-looking’ (DIT,FIT)
regime. Note that the means were calculated from a second order approximation and thus
capture the eﬀe c to fs e c o n do r d e rm o m e n t so nﬁrst order moments. The lower panel contains
the corresponding standard deviations.
13Two interesting results emerge from Figure 6: First, when both central banks target their
producer prices (DIT,FIT), a higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution leads to a higher
variability in domestic employment.15 But since the monetary regime prevents domestic pro-
ducers from charging higher prices, there is no variability in the domestic notional prices.
Second, in an exchange rate peg low values of η imply a high domestic employment variability.
Hence the incentive to raise average producer prices is higher. In fact, when the elasticity of
substitution is low, the expected notional domestic price is high. The higher expected domestic
prices translate into a more appreciated (expected) terms of trade and thus lower expected
domestic employment and consumption. When does a unilateral peg welfare dominate? The
answer depends on the tradeoﬀ between the welfare gains from lower expected employment
and the welfare losses associated with lower expected consumption. Figure 4 suggest that this
is the case exactly when the elasticity, η,e x c e e d s5 . 5
[Insert Figure 6 about here].
5.2.2 Results from the analytical method16
We now proceed to evaluate welfare using the analytical approach described in Benigno and
Woodford (2003). This essentially relies on taking a second order approximation to all the
structural equilibrium conditions as well as to the welfare function. As shown in the technical
appendix, we follow Benigno and Benigno (2003b) closely and derive a quadratic micro-founded
loss function (22) for the domestic central bank.17,18
Lt = ΛYH
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The domestic welfare losses will depend on quadratic deviations of terms of trade, ˆ Tt,
domestic output, ˆ YH,t, foreign output, ˆ YF,t, domestic producer inﬂation, πH,t,a n df o r e i g n
producer inﬂation, π∗
F,t, from their respective target values ˜ Tt,˜ YH,t,˜ YF,t.19 The parameters
¡
ΛYH,ΛYF,ΛT,ΛYH , T,ΛYF , T,q πh,q πf
¢
a r ec r u c i a ls i n c et h e yd e t e r m i n et h er e l a t i v el o s sc o n -
tribution due to deviations around each target variable. As shown in the technical appendix,
these weights are nonlinear functions of the underlying structural parameters of the model.
14We are particularly interested in how the loss contributions from terms of trade deviations and
inﬂation variability changes as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (η) increases and
the domestic country size (n)f a l l s . 20 This could further support our ﬁnding in section 5.2 that
a small country facing an elastic export demand curve would prefer a unilateral exchange rate
peg. Recall from Figure 6, that a unilateral peg reduces the volatility in the terms of trade
while increasing domestic producer price variability. On the other hand, a policy of internal
price stabilization implies no volatility in domestic producer prices but greater ﬂuctuations in
the terms of trade.
[Insert Figure 7 about here].
Figure 7 plots the values of the coeﬃcients on domestic producer inﬂation, qπh(solid line)
and on terms of trade deviations ΛT (dotted line) for diﬀerent values of η.T h eu p p e rp a n e l
of Figure 7 considers the case where countries are symmetric (n =0 .5). All other parameters
are equal to the values summarized in Table 2. As the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
increase, the loss from terms of trade variability, ΛT, rises while the loss from inﬂation vari-
ability, qπh, declines. However for all values of η, the loss contribution from domestic inﬂation
variability clearly outweighs the losses arising from terms of trade variability. This supports
our ﬁnding in Figure 3, that in the case of symmetric country sizes the domestic central bank
would rather choose to target domestic producer prices rather than ﬁx the exchange rate.
The lower panel explores the case where the domestic country is relatively small (n =0 .005).
Here the loss from domestic inﬂation variability, qπh,i sa l s od e c r e a s i n gi nη while the loss
contribution from terms of trade deviations, ΛT increases. However, for values of η above 6 we
note that ΛT exceeds qπh suggesting that the domestic central bank would prefer an exchange
rate peg in order to minimize terms of trade deviations. Fixing the exchange rate does entail
greater domestic producer price variability. But as the coeﬃcient qπh turns negative when the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds 6, more variability in prices actually improves
domestic welfare.
Finally, Figure 8 conﬁrms the role played by the relative domestic country size n.21 The
loss contribution arising from terms of trade deviations increasingly dominates the losses from
producer inﬂation variability as the domestic country gets smaller. This suggests that smaller
countries would want to choose an exchange rate peg and minimize terms of trade deviations.
15[Insert Figure 8 about here].
6 Conclusion and suggestions for further work
Recently a number of papers have argued that optimal monetary policy for open economies
should be purely inward-looking. This paper revisits the choice of monetary policy rules in
an open economy setting. We ﬁnd that stabilizing internal prices is not an optimal policy
when the country is small, open and faces an elastic export demand curve (high intratemporal
elasticity of substitution). As goods become more elastic, a policy of internal price stabilization
leads to greater variability in employment and thus higher uncertainty about marginal costs.
When the central bank stabilizes producer prices, the domestic producer cannot respond to
the greater marginal cost uncertainty by charging on average higher prices. Ineﬃcient markup
ﬂuctuations will occur and an ’inward-looking’ policy cannot be optimal.
On the contrary, a unilateral exchange rate peg allows the producer to charge higher average
prices and his markups are then less aﬀected by real disturbances. Compared to the case of
producer price targeting, an exchange rate peg implies a more appreciated expected terms
of trade and hence lower expected employment and consumption. For small countries facing
elastic export demand curves, the welfare gains from lower expected employment outweigh the
losses associated with lower expected consumption.
T h ec a s ef o rﬁxing exchange rates in our work is closely related to the point made by
Benigno and Benigno (2003a) and in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a) that central banks in an
open economy can use ” sticky prices to manipulate the terms of trade to their own country’s
advantage”. The incentive to exploit this so-called terms of trade externality increases with
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and decreases with domestic country size.
We deliberately choose the most parsimonious model featuring only traded goods producers
in order to accentuate the role played by the terms of trade externality. This modelling choice
comes at several costs: First, in reality central banks do target a broader price index including
also the price of nontraded goods. Second, we abstract from other plausible sources of nominal
rigidity such as wage and export price stickiness . Finally, another interesting venue for future
research would be to assume that international ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.
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19Notes
1Their case for ﬂoating exchange rates is similar to Friedman (1953): Nominal exchange rate movements
provide the appropriate terms of trade adjustment when goods prices are rigid.
2Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) also argue that producer price targeting can be ”suboptimal”. However, they
assume prices are preset in local currency and hence ﬁrms’ proﬁts are exposed to currency ﬂuctuations. Our
”suboptimality” result holds in a setup where prices are preset in the currency of the producer.
3Benigno & Benigno (2002) also leave real money balances out of the utility funtion and interpret their model
as a cash-limiting economy where the utility gains from holding real money goes to zero.
4For a formal discussion on the role played by the competitive ﬁrm or ”bundler”, see Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2000) or Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002)
5The consumer Euler equations can then be used to derive the interest rate adjustment required to control
either prices (DIT) or the exchange rate (PEG).
6T h ee q u a t i o n su s e dt h em o d e la r el i s t e di nS e c t i o n2 . 4
7Sutherland (2002) provides an alternative to the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) approach.
8We use the Dynare toolbox to employ the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) approach as well as to generate
the ﬁrst and second order moments.
9For instance Heathcote & Perri (2002) set the parameter equal to 0.9 while Backus, Kydland and Kehoe
(1995) assume 1.5. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2003) calibrate their model to match the volatility of the real
exchange rate relative to output by varying the elasticity. They focus on two values namely 0.86 and 1.06
10Benigno and Benigno (2003b) also show that the optimality of producer price targeting does not necessarily
hold for a more general model speciﬁcation.
11The Technical Appendix brieﬂy summarizes the principles behind the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
approach.
12We have explored the welfare diﬀerences across regimes in an extension to this model which features imported
goods that are used as intermediate inputs. Here exchange rate volatility will also aﬀect the optimal input
mix. Not surprisingly, we do ﬁnd that such a setup yields higher welfare diﬀerences. Similarly, we have also
done a sensitivity analysis changing various parameters (i.e. higher labor supply elasticity and lower domestic
expenditure weights γ). In both cases, a peg welfare dominates for values of the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution, η, higher 3.5. These results are available upon request.
13Interestingly Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a) ﬁnd that small countries do not beneﬁtf r o ma ne x c h a n g er a t e
peg. Their welfare analysis, however, relies on a setup which allows for a closed form solution by assuming a
unitary value of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution.
14The ’notional price’ is really the optimal price deﬁned as ˜ PH,t (j) in equation (19).
15The evidence in Figure 1 already suggested this would be the case.
16We are indebted to Gianluca Benigno for invaluable input on this section.
17Note, however, that the model in Benigno and Benigno (2003b) diﬀers from ours in one crucial aspect: Since
they assume the domestic country size equals the domestic expenditure weight (n = γ), foreign and domestic
preferences are symmetric. This implies that PPP holds at the aggregate level Pt = StP
∗
t . In our model with
asymmetric country sizes and preferences, aggregate PPP may not necessarily hold.
18The technical appendix can be downloaded from our homepages.
19Note that variables with a
0hat
0 represent log deviations from the steady state while variables with a ’tilde
0
are log deviations of target variables from the steady state.
20We therefore abstract from the loss contributions due to the covariance terms. Our numerical analysis
revealed that the coeﬃcients of the covariance terms are close to zero.
2021In drawing the plot, we assume that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution equals 8.
21Tables
Table 1: Calibration Parameters for the Benchmark Case
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.99
ρ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1
n Relative size of domestic economy 0.005
θ,θ∗ Elasticity of substitution across brands 6
χ I n v e r s eo fF r i s c hE l a s t i c i t yo fL a b o rS u p p l y 3
α,α∗ Calvo price stickiness parameter 0.75
γ Domestic Openess Parameter 0.6










σH,σF Standard deviation of shocks 1%
σHF Covariance of shocks 0.000077
Notes for Table 1: The parameters are similar to the calibration in Gali & Monacelli (2002).
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Figure 1: Effects of a (normalized) asymmetric 1% rise in domestic productivity







Foreign Consumption of Foreign Produced Goods
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Note: This figure explores the effects of a (normalized) asymmetric domestic productivity shock for different
values of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Countries are symmetric (n=0.5). All other parameters
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Figure 2: Effects of a (normalized) asymmetric 1% rise in domestic productivity
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Note: The figure explores the effects of a (normalized) asymmetric domestic productivity shock for different
values of the relative size of the domestic country (n). The intratemporal elasticity of substitution is




















Figure 3: Welfare under different Monetary Policy Rules (Symmetric countries)
Note: Welfare is the conditional expected present discounted value of utility.
Home and Foreign countries are assumed to be symmetric (n=0.5) 








































Figure 4: Welfare under different Monetary Policy Rules (Asymmetric Country Sizes)
Note: Welfare is the conditional expected present discounted value of disutility.
The relative size of the domestic country is assumed to be n=0.005. 











eFigure 5: Welfare Gains from a Unilateral Exchange Rate Peg

























































































Note: This figure calculates the welfare difference between the two alternative monetary regimes
for different values of the relative size of the domestic country (n). The intratemporal elasticity of












































































































Figure 6: Moments of Terms of Trade, Domestic Notional Prices, Employment and Consumption
Note: Mean denotes the conditional expectation of the variable.Moments were




















Varying Intratemporal elasticity of substitution (asymmetric countries)





































Figure 7: Weights in the Loss Function of volatility in Terms of Trade and Inflation









Varying Intratemporal elasticity of substitution (symmetric countries)



































Note: This figure explores how the loss function coefficients change with the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution. All other parameters are as in our benchmark calibration. In the lower panel,
the relative size parameter, n, equals 0.005. In the top panel, it equals 0.5 (symmetric countries) Figure 8: Weights in the Loss Function of volatility in Terms of Trade and Inflation












Varying domestic country size 





































Note: This figure explores how the loss coefficients change with relative country size.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution is assumed to equal 8. All other parameters
are as in our benchmark calibration.